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Henderson and Twerski: The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement

THE POLITICS OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT
James A. Henderson,Jr.*
Aaron D. Twerski **
Some critics of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
("Products Restatement") have argued that the project was highly politicized, with the Reporters acting as brokers negotiating compromises
among powerful interests.' Having served as the Reporters in question,
we would like to set the record straight. In no meaningful sense of the
term did we "play politics" in our roles as drafters of the new Restatement. As for the criteria (possibly "political") upon which we were selected in the beginning, we cannot speak because obviously we were not
involved in our own selection. Nor can we speak to the motivations
(possibly "political?") behind the individual votes cast at the Annual
Meetings of The American Law Institute before whom we brought various proposals over a five-year period. However, we can speak from
firsthand experience regarding external political pressures brought to
bear on us in formulating our drafts.
If the term "political" is defined as used in common parlance, then
we categorically assert that external political pressures played no role in
influencing our participation in the Products Restatement. At no time
did any individual or group threaten to withhold support or approval
unless we succumbed to making a change with which we disagreed as to

* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1959, Princeton University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University. Professor Henderson served as the coReporter for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
** Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth Medrash
Elyon Research Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1965, Marquette
University. Professor Twerski served as the co-Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.
1. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft Restatement of
ProductsLiability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 215, 217 (1997) [hereinafter Shapo, A New Legislation]; Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of ProductsLiability: The ALI Restatement Project,
48 VAND. L. Rnv. 631, 645-46 (1995) [hereinafter Shapo, The AL Restatement Project].
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the substantive merits. Stated differently, we sincerely believe that the
new Restatement is as good as we were capable of making it. We are
human and surmise it is not perfect. But we also know it is not a
"political" document as the phrase is commonly used. If this assertion
appears extreme, so be it. It is the truth, as we know it.
Of course, if the term "politics" is broadened to include the art of
opening up the process to persons with varying views of public policy,
engaging them in dialogue, and responding on the merits to their criticisms and suggestions regarding what the law is and should be, we
plead guilty to having "played politics" in the first degree. From the
very outset of the project the ALI encouraged the broadest possible par-

ticipation from all constituencies.2 We received lengthy submissions
from plaintiff and defense groups on a host of issues. Academicians
made their voices heard both directly and in the law reviews3 and often

2. For every project, the ALI appoints a group of formal Advisers who review all preliminary drafts before the drafts are submitted to the ALI Council for approval. Three Advisers were
nationally known plaintiffs' counsel: Robert L. Habush, Paul D. Rheingold, and Bill Wagner.
Their counterparts on the defense side are equally prominent: Sheila L. Birnbaum, John W. Martin, Jr., and Victor E. Schwartz. The other thirteen members of the Advisers were law professors
and members of the judiciary. They brought to the project widely differing views and perspectives
on the law of products liability. The Reporters met with the Advisers for two-day sessions each
year of the project. In addition, approximately 300 ALI members joined the Members Consultative
Group. This group also received all preliminary drafts and met with the Reporters once each year.
Finally, representatives from the American Bar Association ("ABA"), the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), the Defense Research Institute ("DRI"), and the Product Liability
Advisory Council ("PLAC") also received preliminary drafts and met with the Reporters to discuss
them each year. The Reporters, after receiving comments and suggestions from all of these groups,
prepared drafts that were then presented to the ALI Council. The Council is the executive body of
the ALI and consists of approximately sixty members drawn from the bench, bar, and academia.
The Council discussed and critiqued the drafts. After formal approval of a draft by the Council, the
Reporters prepared a tentative draft that was distributed to the entire membership and was then
discussed and voted on at the Annual Meeting of the AI in May of each year. Thus, each draft
was subject to intense scrutiny by constituencies that represented almost all conceivable interests.
3. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (1995); Philip H.
Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriersto Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. Rnv. 1043 (1994) (arguing that imposition
of unduly burdensome proof requirements in the Products Liability Restatement are contrary to the
notion of strict liability and hinders access to the courtroom for meritorious claimants); Harvey M.
Grossman, CategoricalLiability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385
(1995) (arguing that strict products liability should not be imposed upon an entire class of products
without an independent determination of defect); Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality
and Risk- The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 283 (1995) (arguing that a risk-utility test should be the only measure of
determining design and warning defects); Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and
Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61
TENN. L. REv. 1173 (1994) (disagreeing with the Products Restatement's usage of the risk-utility
test as the sole test to prove defect); Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in
ProductStrict LiabilityActions for Defectively DesignedProducts,61 TENN. L. REV. 1189 (1994)
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favored us with early drafts of their articles. Judges wrote to us not only
suggesting substantive changes but also requesting clarifications as to
whether our pronouncements were to be interpreted as rules of law or
were merely factors that would be considered by them in deciding
whether a case merited submission to a jury. Needless to say, all of
these submissions reflected "political" views in this broader, benign
sense. One could hardly imagine drafting a workable Restatement without involving "political" views in the broader sense of the term.
When suggestions were made and we thought them meritorious,
we would often share them with some of the Advisers to the project or
with ALL members who had spoken on the subject at the ALI Annual

Meeting or at Members Consultative Group meetings. On occasion,
sharp disagreement arose among those whose advice we sought. When
we perceived that a substantive suggestion was correct but that the suggested language was either too harsh or possibly misleading, we sought
to cure the deficiency by careful drafting. The costs to us, as Reporters,
of involving informed members in the deliberative process were substantial. Bringing as many people into the process as possible exacted an
enormous toll in time and effort. But it was time and effort well spent.
As the drafts evolved, they became more nuanced and sophisticated. We
tried to take heed of even the harshest of our critics. The impact of their

(arguing that the consumer expectations test should not be completely abandoned in the definitions
of defective design and defective warning); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661 (1997) (developing
a new "cost-benefit micro-balancing" test for assessing design defects); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles'
Heel, 61 TENN.L. REv. 1265 (1994) (arguing that the ALI should seek to refine the notion of strict
liability in defect cases rather than reject it completely); Shapo, A New Legislation, supra note I,
at 215; Shapo, The ALI Restatement Project, supranote 1, at 631; Frank J. Vandall, Constructing
a Roof Before the FoundationIs Prepare&The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFOR 261, 279 (1997) [hereinafter Vandall, Constructing a Roof] (concluding that "[tihe treatment of design defect in the Restatement (Third)is a
political statement" and that it fails to properly assess present case law); Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design
Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407 (1994) [hereinafter Vandall, The Reasonable Alternative
Design Requirement] (arguing that the reasonable alternative design requirement in defect cases is
not supported by a majority of the case law and would drastically limit suits by injured consumers); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. MEm. L. REV. 493, 557 (1996) (analyzing each state's common law, statutes and pattern jury instructions on design defect and concluding that "the strict liability consumer expectations test is utilized over six times more often than the ALI [risk-utility) rule"); Ellen
Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible
Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN.L. REV. 1429, 1454 (1994) (concluding that the Products Restatement's imposition of a reasonable alternative design requirement in defect cases is
"neither intellectually justifiable, morally acceptable, or economically sound").
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arguments can be found throughout the Products Restatement.

Interestingly enough, the most significant modifications to the
Products Restatement drafts occurred with regard to the most controversial sections of the Products Restatement. For example, the earliest
draft of the Products Restatement provided that a plaintiff, in order to
make out a case of defective design, must prove the availability of a
"reasonable alternative design" that would have reduced or avoided

harm to the plaintiff.4 Powerful policy arguments as to why that should

not be an inexorable .rule were made by the plaintiffs' bar and some

members of the legal academy." Over time we became convinced that
several important exceptions to that rule should be set forth, and they
were embodied in the final draft. 6 We were under no illusions that pro-

4. See RSTATEMENT ('rHiRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
(setting forth the "reasonable alternative design" test as the exclusive test for design defect).
5. The strongest advocates for a more inclusive definition of design defect were Robert L.
Habush, Bill Wagner, and Professor Marshall S. Shapo. The views of Philip H. Corboy and Professor Marshall Shapo are detailed in the articles set forth, supra note 3.
6. The two most significant exceptions to the "reasonable alternative design" requirement
are set forth in section 2, comment e and section 3. Section 2, comment e provides:
e. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonabledesign. Several courts
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly unreasonable, in
that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach
even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design. In large part the problem is one of
how the range of relevant alternative designs is described. For example, a toy gun that
shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be
found to be defectively designed within the rule of Subsection (b). Toy guns unlikely to
cause injury would constitute reasonable alternatives to the dangerous toy. Thus, toy
guns that project ping-pong balls, soft gelatin pellets, or water might be found to be
reasonable alternative designs to a toy gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the
realism of the hard-pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who purchase and use such products to justify the court's limiting consideration to toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no reasonable
alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In that instance, the design feature that defines which alternatives are relevant-the realism of the hard-pellet gun and thus its capacity to injure-is precisely the feature on which the user places value and of which
the plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt this characterization of the product, and
deem the capacity to cause injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use
by children, it could conclude that liability should attach without proof of a reasonable
alternative design. The court would declare the product design to be defective and not
reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow children
to use, the product.
RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LLAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998).
Section 3 provides:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect,
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viding for these exceptions would lead to the organized plaintiffs' bar
approving of the design standard, even as modified. We embraced the
exceptions not out of considerations of political expediency, but because
we believed them to be right. Indeed, an argument can be made that
these changes came at considerable political cost-the vocal disaffection of some defense-oriented critics generated by these exceptions was,
and remains, quite substantial.7
In short, we aimed at building consensus whenever our research
supported doing so. But in a number of instances, we made significant
substantive changes even when it was clear to us that we would thereby
curry favor with no one, and even when we were sure that the change
would upset powerful interests on one side or another. Ultimately, our
endorsement of those changes carried the day with a substantial majority of the ALI membership voting at the Annual Meeting in May 1997,

not because they pleased constituencies, but because they rang true. If
we accomplished a measure of success, it came about not because we
were politically adept, but because we involved the body politic at every

when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
Id.§3.
Comment b to section 3 makes it clear that under appropriate circumstances, one may draw
an inference of design defect without proof of a "reasonable alternative design":
Although the rules in this Section ... most often apply to manufacturing defects,
occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction in a manner identical
to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect. Thus, an aircraft
may inadvertently be designed in such a way that, in new condition and while flying
within its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly and unexpectedly fall
off, causing harm. In theory, of course, the plaintiff in such a case would be able to
show how other units in the same production line were designed, leading to a showing
of a reasonable alternative design under § 2(b). As a practical matter, however, when
the incident involving the aircraft is one that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect, and evidence in the particular case establishes that the harm was not solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at time of sale, it should not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of proving whether the failure resulted from a
manufacturing defect or from a defect in the design of the product. Section 3 allows the
trier of fact to draw the inference that the product was defective whether due to a manufacturing defect or a design defect. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff need not
specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction.
Id. § 3 cmt. b.
7. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 3; Jonathan M. Hoffman, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Indeterminate Product Defects: If They Speak for Themselves, What Are They Saying?, 36 S. TEX. L.
REv. 353 (1995) (suggesting that the "res ipsa" exception in section 3 of the Products Restatement
can co-exist with the risk-utility test and reasonable alternative design requirement of section 2
only if section 3 is understood to define an entirely separate class of indeterminate defects).
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step of the process. This involvement assured not only a fair hearing for
opposing views, but also an avenue for modification and amendment of
the drafts.

I. THE "POLmCS" OF REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
A.

The Triumph ofRisk Utility over ConsumerExpectations

From the outset it was clear that in formulating a rule for design
defect we had to choose between some form of risk-utility test and a test
based on the disappointment of consumer expectations. For all practical
purposes these were the tests for defective design reflected in the decided case law.8 Admittedly, several jurisdictions had articulated a twopronged test for defect that allows a plaintiff to prevail if the product
design fails either the risk-utility or the consumer expectations test.9
However, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions eschews this
"either-or" approach." Our examination of the case law" and the writ8. For cases supporting risk-utility balancing as the standard for design defect, see infra
note 11. Only a small minority of states recognizes the consumer expectations test as a stand-alone
test for design defect. See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosely Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987); Woods
v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw.
1983).
10. The jurisdictions set forth, supra note 9, are the only ones to espouse this two-pronged
approach to defect. All others that have spoken either embrace the risk-utility test or the consumer
expectations test. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982) (affirming the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that defect in design may be found if it satisfies either the
risk-utility or consumer expectations test).
11. The case law supporting risk-utility balancing as the standard for design defect is overwhelming. See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411,418 (Ala. 1994); General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985) (requiring both a reasonable alternative design and that the "utility of the alternative design outweighed the utility of the design actually used"); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (affirming the
trial court's jury instruction which stated, "[a] product is unreasonably dangerous because of a
defect in its design if it creates a risk of harm to persons which is not outweighed by the benefits to
be achieved from such design'); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 535 (Del. 1998)
(holding that a reasonable alternative design is necessary to prove a design defect in a crashworthiness case); Warner Freuhauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995) (holding
that "the plaintiff must 'show the risks, costs and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs,' and 'that the magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of
avoiding the danger"' (quoting Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983) (opining that the term
"unreasonably dangerous" describes more accurately a manufacturer's or supplier's liability by
balancing "the likelihood and gravity of potential injury" versus the product's utility, the availability of "safer products to meet the same need, the obviousness of the danger, public knowledge
and expectation of the danger, the adequacy of instructions and warnings on safe use, and the abil-
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ity to eliminate or minimize the danger without seriously impairing the product or making it unduly expensive"); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the
court's review of case law and treatises "revealed a general consensus regarding the utilization in
design defect cases of a balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product design are weighed
against the utility or benefit derived from the product"); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169,
1172 (Me. 1992) (determining whether a product is defectively dangerous by balancing "the danger presented by the product against its utility"); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 539 A.2d
701, 706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (finding the risk-utility test "the only appropriate test to be
applied in the instant case because it allows 'full consideration of the relative merits of a product
design' (quoting Edward S. Digges, Jr. & John G. Billmyre, Product Liability in Maryland:
Traditionaland Emerging Theories of Recovey and Defense, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 16 (1986)));
Caron v. General Motors Corp., 643 N.E.2d 471,476 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that jury must
engage in a risk-utility analysis in defective design cases); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324
N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting the latent-patent danger rule in design defect cases and
substituting a "reasonable care" balancing test); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248,
254 (Miss. 1993) (noting that a plaintiff may "recover for any injury resulting from" a product if
she can prove that "the utility of the product is outweighed by the danger that the product creates"); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986) (finding that a jury must
engage in risk-utility balancing in design defect cases); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (stating that when "weighing utility and desirability against danger,
courts should also consider whether the risk of danger could have been reduced without significant
impact on product effectiveness and manufacturing cost"); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d
1269, 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (stating that determining "whether a product has been
defectively designed ordinarily involves a 'risk-utility analysis"'); Carrel v. Allied Prods. Corp.,
No. 9-94-24, 1995 WL 423388, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1995) (noting that under the statutory risk-utility test a plaintiff must prove "'that the product design is in a defective condition because the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risks inherent in such design"'
(quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 494 n.5 (1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 677 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1997)); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995) ("Whether a product is defectively designed.., is a question.., for the court to consider by balancing the product's utility against the magnitude of the risk associated with its use."
(citing Roach v. Kononen/Ford Motor Co., 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974)); Morningstar v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W. Va. 1979) (testing allegedly defective products by a
risk-utility balancing test).
Some states have enacted statutes requiring a risk-utility balancing approach for design defect claims. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (Vest 1997) (adopting a risk-utility standard and providing that a product is designed unreasonably dangerously if, "at the time the product left its manufacturer's control," a safer, alternative design for the product existed and the
"likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that
damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the
adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product"); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1997) (providing that a product is not defectively designed if claimant's harm
"was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product
that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(E) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (providing that a product is
not defectively designed if a plaintiffs injury resulted from "an inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability"); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.005 (West 1997) (providing that plaintiff must prove the existence of a "safer alternative design" that "would have prevented or significantly reduced" the claimant's risk of injury "without
substantially impairing the product's utility").
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ings of leading academic commentators 12 convince us that the risk-

utility approach not only represents the strong majority rule but also
constitutes the only sensible method for establishing a standard for defective design. The consumer expectations test is not only hopelessly

open-ended but also potentially self-contradictory. Basing liability on
defective product design is not a sport for dullards. If one attacks a
product design as defective, a manufacturer seeking to correct the defect
must redesign the product. Frequently the redesign, in eliminating the
original risks, introduces other risks of roughly equal magnitude. Consumers injured by either of the designs can justifiably argue that their
expectations were disappointed. If both claims are recognized as valid, a
manufacturer cannot rationally respond to the demands of the law, short
of removing its product from the market. That is not the law, nor should

it be.
If, indeed, risk-utility balancing is the strong majority view and is

so logically compelling, how is it that courts often make reference to the
consumer expectations test in defective design cases? As we searched
the reported cases, we discovered that courts invoke consumer expectations in three very distinct ways. Some courts use the test as a clumsy

12. See, e.g., WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 149, 644 (4th ed.
1971) (defining the standard of conduct in negligence as a balancing of "the risk .... probability
and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and
the expedience of the course pursued" and writing that in the area of design defect a manufacturer's liability appears to be "essentially a matter of negligence"); David A. Fischer, Products
Liabilit)-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 359 (1974) (arguing that "courts should
consider, in light of the facts of the particular case, the merits of the policies underlying strict liability and balance [those] considerations against countervailing factors"); James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1532-34 (1992) (analyzing design defect cases and concluding
that the great majority of courts apply some form of risk-utility balancing test); W. Page Keeton,
Products Liability--Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 313
(1979) (proposing that a product be determined defectively designed "if a reasonable person would
conclude that the magnitude of the danger.., outweighs the utility of the design"); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL
STuD. 535, 553-54 (1985) (endorsing use of risk-utility analysis in design defect cases); David G.
Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 239 (1997)
("Courts and commentators increasingly comprehend that ascertaining design defectiveness in
products liability cases requires some kind of 'risk-utility' balancing."); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProductsLiability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 464 (1979) ("There can be little
doubt about the correctness of the risk-benefit standard for design defect .... ); Victor E.
Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act--A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REv. 579, 586
(1980) (writing that the Uniform Product Liability Act has adopted a standard for design defect
cases that "balances risk against utility"); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor
Products,44 MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (listing factors to be balanced in a risk-utility analysis).
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circumlocution of the risk-utility test.'3 These courts assert that consumers have a right to expect reasonably designed products. A product is
not reasonably designed if it fails to meet risk-utility standards. Therefore, products that fail to meet risk-utility standards fail to meet consumer expectations. A second, and more common, application of consumer expectations occurs in a special class of cases where courts
perceive no need to perform risk-utility balancing to reach a conclusion
of product defect. On occasion, products fail unexpectedly and catastrophically while being used normally. When a product fails to perform
its manifestly intended function, a court may impose liability saying
that the product failed the consumer expectations test. 4 This version of
the consumer expectations test is nothing more than the traditional rule
of res ipsa loquitur in a products liability setting.' When the incident
that harmed the plaintiff is of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of
product defect, the finder of fact may draw a common-sense inference
that a defect was responsible for the harm.' 6 Finally, some courts utilize
the consumer expectations test as a thinly disguised version of the patent danger rule.'7 In the early period when design defect liability was in

13. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978) ("The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.... Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On one side of the
scale is the utility of the product and on the other is the risk of its use." (citations omitted)); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (en bane) ("In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant ....).
14. See Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
("[E]vidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circumstances, give rise to a
reasonable inference that the product was defective because the circumstances of the product's
failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinary consumer's expectations of its continued performance."); Tulgetske v. R.D. Weiner Co., 408 N.E.2d 492, 496 (111.App. Ct. 1980) (holding that a
plaintiff can make out a strict liability claim by proving that a product failed to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of its intended function); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding in a fire case, that "the reasonable expectations of a buyer of a motor vehicle is that the main electrical cable harness of such
vehicle will not start a fire").
15. See Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) ('The doctrine
[of res ipsa loquitur] is not strictly applicable to a products liability case because.., the defendant.., has parted with possession and control of the harmful object before the accident occurs ....But the doctrine merely instantiates the broader principle, which is as applicable to a
products case as to any other tort case, that an accident can itself be evidence of liability."
(citations omitted)).
16. See cases cited supranote 14.
17. See, e.g., Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Illinois law precluded liability as a matter of law in a case where a two year-old child started a
fatal fire with a cigarette lighter, concluding that "[tihe ordinary consumer expects that if a
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its developmental stage, courts held that manufacturers had no duty to
eliminate open and obvious dangers from their designs, even if they
could do so at a reasonable cost. 8 Most courts have abandoned the
"patent danger rule,"' 9 but some have retained it by utilizing the rubric
of the consumer expectations test.20 Products that are patently dangerous
do not disappoint consumer expectations. The Products Restatement
takes note of each of these usages of the consumer expectations test.

1. Rejecting Consumer Expectations Rubric When Actually
Applying Risk-Utility Test
The Products Restatement finds no merit whatsoever in adopting
the consumer expectations test as the standard for design defect and
then making the operative rule depend upon whether the product was
reasonably designed utilizing risk-utility standards. 2' If risk-utility bal-

ancing is the operative test, then one should simply say so. No substantive difference exists between courts that state that reasonable consumers have a right to expect reasonably designed products and the Products
Restatement's risk-utility approach. The Products Restatement has chosen to state its test for defect in a straightforward, non-circular manner.
2. Adopting Consumer Expectations Test in Res Ipsa Cases
The second use of the consumer expectations test to impose liability in res ipsa-like cases is embraced in a black letter rule in the Products Restatement. Section 3 provides for liability when the incident that
caused the plaintiff's harm is of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result

lighter's flame is put to some other combustible object, a larger fire ensues"); Kelley v. Rival Mfg.
Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1046 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (dismissing a claim of design defect in a case
involving an 11-month old child who was seriously injured when the child pulled on the chord of
slow cooker partially filled with hot beans off the kitchen table because the product met the expectations of the parent consumer who purchased the product).
18. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950) ("[IThe manufacturer is
under no duty to render a machine or other article 'more' safe-as long as the danger to be
avoided is obvious and patent to all.").
19. The New York Court of Appeals overruled Campo in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d
571, 577 (N.Y. 1976). A strong majority of American courts reject the patent danger rule. See, e.g.,
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970) (in bank); Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co.,
551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind.1990); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Owens v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d
207 (Minn. 1982); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
20. See cases cited supra note 17; see also Elliot v. Brunswick Corp., 905 F.2d 1505 (11th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting, under Alabama law, the risk-utility claim of a plaintiff on the ground that
products whose inherent danger is patent are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law).
21. See RESTATEMENT (TuRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. L ,B.
§ 2 cmt. g (1998).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss3/7

10

Henderson and Twerski: The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement
1998]

POLITICS AND THE PRODUCTSLIABILIYRESTATEMENT

of product defect and did not solely result from other causes.' The black

letter specifically provides that when the res ipsa test is met, liability
attaches without the necessity of identifying the type of defect that triggered the harm. It makes no difference if the product failed due to a
manufacturing or a design defect.' A product that fails its manifestly
intended function is blatantly defective. 4 Again, there is no substantive
difference between liability imposed by section 3 of the Products Restatement and the judicial imposition of liability in res ipsa cases based

on consumer expectations. To be sure, products that fail in res ipsa
situations disappoint consumer expectations. The Products Restatement
has chosen to articulate this shortcut to the conclusion that a product is
defective by setting forth the classic elements necessary to invoke the
res ipsa inference rather than create a new substantive test for imposing

liability in this class of cases.
3.

Rejecting the Consumer Expectations Test When It Is Used as
a Surrogate for the Patent Damages Rule
The third use of the consumer expectations test as a surrogate for
the patent danger rule is expressly rejected by the Products Restatement.2& As noted, the patent danger rule retains its vibrancy in only a
22. The text of section 3 is set forth supra note 6.
23. The text of section 3 and relevant portions of comment b are set forth supra note 6. Section 3, comment c makes it clear just how broad the allowed inference is. It provides:
c. No requirement that plaintiffprove what aspect of the product was defective.
The inference of defect may be drawn under this Section without proof of the specific
defect. Furthermore, quite apart from the question of what type of defect was involved,
the plaintiff need not explain specifically what constituent part of the product failed.
For example, if an inference of defect can be appropriately drawn in connection with
the catastrophic failure of an airplane, plaintiff need not establish whether the failure is
attributable to fuel tank explosion or engine malfunction.
RESTATFiENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 3 cmt. c (1998).
24. See id. § 3 cmt. b. Comment b notes the limited application of the res ipsa-like inference:
It is important to emphasize the difference between a general inference of defect
under § 3 and claims of defect brought directly under §§ 1 and 2. Section 3 claims are
limited to situations where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function,
thus supporting the conclusion that a defect of some kind is the most probable explanation.
Id.
25. See id. § 2 cmt. d. Comment d states:
Early in the development of products liability law, courts held that a claim based
on design defect could not be sustained if the dangers presented by the product were
open and obvious. Subsection (b) does not recognize the obviousness of a designrelated risk as precluding a finding of defectiveness. The fact that a danger is open and
obvious is relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a
plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable alternative design should have been
adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the plaintiff.
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small minority of courts.a The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
have held that the consumer expectations test should not serve as a
shield against the imposition of liability if a plaintiff can establish that
under risk-utility standards a safer design could have been implemented
that would have prevented harm to the plaintiff.'7
The Products Restatement thus recognizes the legitimacy of the
consumer expectations test as a stand alone test for defect only in the res
ipsa-type case. In this class of cases one can infer defect since the product has failed to perform its manifestly intended function. In the classic
design case involving controversy as to whether the product as marketed
or an alternative provides the optimum in reasonable safety, one cannot
infer defect using the consumer expectations test. No substitute exists in
non-res ipsa cases for a full presentation of evidence that addresses such
factors as the magnitude and probability of foreseeable risks of harm,
the instructions and warnings that accompany the product, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed and as it
alternatively could have been designed.2
B. Rejecting the ConsumerExpectations Test-The Negation of
Causationin ProductsLitigation
In addition to the reasons set forth, yet another powerful argument
can be made for rejecting the consumer expectations test in the classic
design defect setting. American tort law insists that causation plays an
independent role in determining liability.29 Causation forces a plaintiff
to move from establishing the defendant's violation of a hypothetical
standard of care to proving the concrete effects of that violation on the
plaintiff's person or property." By forcing the plaintiff to prove that
conformance with the hypothetical standard would have made a differId.; see also idl. § 2 cmt. g.
26. See cases cited supra notes 17 and 20; see also McCollum v. Grove Mfg., Co., 293
S.E.2d 632, 637 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Georgia and Minnesota among the jurisdictions
that recognize the "patent danger" rule).
27. See cases cited supranote 19.
28. See RESTATEMENT (TRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f(1998).
29. See generally ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961) (analyzing role of causation in tort
law); H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOP, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985) (same).
30. See Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(holding in a failure-to-warn case, that plaintiff need not establish causal nexus between defect and
plaintiff's injury), rev'd, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972) (holding that plaintiff must establish
causation but will be aided by a rebuttable presumption of causation); see also Graves v. Church &
Dwight Co., 631 A.2d 1248, 1258 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1993) (upholding a jury verdict that
defendant rebutted presumption that warning was causally related to plaintiff's injury).
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ence in this case, the causation doctrine provides important confirmation that the standard of care has been established correctly.3 ' Furthermore, causation gives voice to fundamental fairness norms.32 Human
conduct often falls short of the ideal. Indiscretions, large or small, most
often pass unnoticed because they have no practical ramifications. Tort
law pays little attention to the "near miss." It is difficult to imagine a
tort doctrine that does not require a substantial causal connection between defendant's breach of a duty and plaintiff's injury. Causation be-

speaks of accountability and takes on a significant moral dimension in
making tort doctrine understandable to actors forced by the law to ac-

cept responsibility for harms to others.
Under a risk-utility balancing test, when a defendant is charged
with failing to adopt a reasonable alternative design, the causation issue
is distinct and separable. Consider, for example, a crashworthiness case
in which a plaintiff claims injuries resulting from being thrown from a
car after impact with an abutment. Plaintiff alleges that the door lock
capable of withstanding only 1,000 pounds of pressure during a colli-

sion should have been designed with a 2,000-pound capability. One can
test whether a lock with the design standard proffered by the plaintiff
would have made any difference. If the evidence demonstrates that the
force of the collision exerted a 5,000-pound force on the door, the design of the lock may be defective but not causally related to the plain-

tiff's injuries.33
31. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 82 (1975).
32. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89
(1973) (arguing that although "but for" causation examines the cause-effect relationship between
defendant's negligent conduct and plaintiff's injuries, proximate causation examines causation as a
matter of "social policy"); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735
(1985) (surveying scholars' notions of causation and concluding that the concepts of "corrective
justice" and "legal responsibility" are entrenched in the causation analysis).
33. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1984) (affirming
judgment notwithstanding the verdict where plaintiff failed to establish that the design defect in
the motorcycle brakes was the cause of the plaintiffs injury). In crashworthiness cases based on
defective design, plaintiff must establish that the defective design caused injury beyond that which
the force of the collision would have brought about had the auto been reasonably designed. For
example, an Alabama court held:
Consequently, the only proof of damages that will limit the manufacturer's liability in
crashworthiness cases is proof that, regardless of the design used, the identical injuries
were inevitable. In such a case, the manufacturer's liability is not only limited, it is
completely eliminated, because plaintiff has failed to prove "cause in fact," a fundamental element necessary to prove proximate cause between the defective condition
and his injuries.
General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1190 (Ala. 1985). Furthermore an Arizona
court held:
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Under the stand-alone consumer expectations test, the causation issue becomes one with the determination of defect. Plaintiff asserts, intuitively, that reasonable consumers expect that car doors will remain
locked in collisions of the sort in which the plaintiff suffered injury.

Thus, not only is liability based on an ethereal standard, causation is a
non-issue.34 It is the perfect plaintiff's case. Plaintiff need not establish
any aspect of the case with hard proof. For the plaintiffs' bar, it is truly
a cause of action made in heaven.
Limiting the consumer expectations test to res ipsa-type cases as
set forth in section 3 of the Products Restatement does not compromise
the causation issue. The classic res ipsa products liability case always
merges defect and causation. It does so credibly because when the product malfunctions, the inference that defect is responsible for the injury is
so stark that one can hardly argue to the contrary. For example, when a

brand new car suddenly spins out of control and plaintiff suffers injury
in the ensuing crash, one need not be a rocket scientist to conclude that
some sort of defect is the cause of plaintiff's harm.35 If alternative explanations for the loss of control are eliminated, as they must be under
res ipsa, defect remains the only culprit.36 However, when one leaves the
[I]n a crashworthiness case with an indivisible injury, the plaintiff fulfills his burden of
proof by showing that the defective design caused him to sustain injuries over and
above those that otherwise would have occurred in the first collision. Once the plaintiff
has done so, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the damages that arose from
the enhanced injury are apportionable.
Czarnecki v. Volkswagen of America, 837 P.2d 1143, 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 16(a) (1998).
34. The consumer expectations test shares some common ground on this point with actions
brought on a failure-to-warn theory. In both, plaintiffs call on the finder of fact to intuit the finding
of defect and then ask the courts to relieve them of proving cause-in-fact in any rigorous fashion.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell of Failureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296-311 (1990). The consumer expectations test is an even more egregious instance of the negation of causation. Actions brought on failure-to-warn theories, it is possible for a defendant to challenge the presumption that the defect was
causally related to the harm suffered. See, e.g., Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 631 A.2d 1248,
1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). The consumer expectations test collapses defect and causation into one issue.
35. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
36. If alternate causes exist that could have been the sole cause of the injury, one cannot
draw an inference that defect was a contributing factor to the plaintiff's harm. See RESTATEMENT
(THID) OFTORTS: PRODS. LLAB. § 3 cmL d (1998). Comment d states:
d. Requirement that the incident thatharmed the plaintiffwas not, in the particular
case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale.
To allow the trier of fact to conclude that a product defect caused the plaintiff's harm
under this Section, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the incident was not solely the result of causal factors other than defect at time of sale.
The defect need not be the only cause of the incident; if the plaintiff can prove that the
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realm of res ipsa and confronts more balanced and sensitive design
problems, the use of the consumer expectations test unacceptably eliminates causation as an independent element of a plaintiff's case.
C. The Shapo Proposal-AListing of Considerations
At the May 1995 and 1997 Annual Meetings of the ALI, Professor
Marshall Shapo proposed that the Institute adopt a new and totally different approach to the problem of defining the standard for defective
design." Professor Shapo has made it clear in his writings that he believes that no hard law exists that allows for the development of a clear
legal standard for design defect." He therefore proposed, by formal motions at two different Annual Meetings, that the following language
should govern defective design:
§ 1. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by
Defective Products
One engaged in the business of selling or distributing products who
sells a product that is in a defective condition or is otherwise unreasonably dangerous to users or to others who encounter products is liable under any theory of liability applicable to defective or unreasonably dangerous products for any harm to person or property caused
by the defect or unreasonably dangerous condition of the product.

most likely explanation of the harm involves the causal contribution of a product defect, the fact that there may be other concurrent causes of the harm does not preclude
liability under this Section. But when the harmful incident can be attributed solely to
causes other than original defect, including the conduct of others, an inference of defect
under this Section cannot be drawn.
Id. § 3 cmt. d. Abundant case law supports this proposition. See, e.g., Sztubinski v. Stanton Trading Corp., No. CIV.A.92-7175, 1994 WL 111353, at *2 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 1994) (holding that a
bottle-opener manufacturer cannot rely on the res ipsa inference in impleading a bottle manufacturer where there is no proof that the bottle did not break because of the opener or some other
cause); Schlier v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 835 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Because
plaintiff did not negate the evidence pointing to a reasonable, secondary cause for the accident,
i.e., wear and tear, plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case."); Saieva v. Budget Rent-A-Car,
591 N.E.2d 507, 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (upholding summary judgment for defendant where
"[t]he record supports the reasonable inference that the plaintiff simply lost control of the van because he was driving at an excessive speed on a dark, wet and bumpy rural highway").
37. Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: ProductsLiability, 74 A.L.I. PROC.
130, 131-32 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Discussion of Products Restatement]; Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products Liability, 72 A.L.I. PRoc. 179, 182-84 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Discussion of ProductsRestatement].
38. See Shapo, A New Legislation, supra note 1, at 216; Shapo, The ALI Restatement Project, supra note 1, at 646-50, 685-86.
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§ 2. Defectiveness of Products
A product is in a defective or unreasonably dangerous condition,
for purposes of section 1, if
(2) Design aspects of the product make it unreasonably unsafe to
persons or property because of considerations that render products defective under applicable law. Considerations principally relevant to a
determination of whether a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous include:
(a) The risks of harm from the product outweigh its utility or
benefits, as risks, utility and benefits are defined by applicable law;
(b) The costs associated with the injury at issue outweigh the
costs of avoiding the injury, as relevant costs are measured by applicable law;
(c) In designing or selling the product, a reasonable seller or
distributor would not have expected the risk of injury that occurred;
(d) The advertising, promotion or appearance of the product
created an impression of safety relevant to the hazard at issue that reasonably could be judged to have a material influence on decisions to
use or encounter the product;
(e) There exists a feasible, reasonable alternative design that
would have significantly reduced or avoided the harm that occurred;
(f) There exists a significant difference between the parties with
respect to knowledge of the risks of the product in the context of its
distribution and marketing.39
We find the Shapo proposal to be wholly unsuitable for a plethora
of reasons. First and foremost, we disagree with its basic premise that
courts have not articulated a rule of law governing defective design.
More than thirty years have come and gone since the onset of the products liability revolution in the early 1960s. Thousands of appellate decisions have been published dealing with the issue of defective design.
To conclude that American courts have given litigants no guidance as to
the standard of liability for design defect cases strains credulity. No industrial colossus could function without a comprehensible standard for
defective design. The task of restaters is to parse this huge body of case
law, to discern the major themes, and to articulate those themes in rules
of law. Professor Shapo offers not a rule of law, but a prescription for
despair.
Second, the Shapo considerations appear to be a smorgasbord of

39. Text of ProposedAmendments Submitted at 1997 Annual Meeting, 74 A.L.I. PROC. 892,
892-93 (1997) (proposed by Professor Marshall Shapo).
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unrelated ideas. Unlike efficiency-based, risk-utility balancing that requires the trier of fact to decide whether marginal risks outweigh marginal benefits,' only factors (a), (b), and (c) in Shapo's proposal appear
to demand some sort of risk-utility balancing, and aggregate (rather than
marginal) balancing, at that. Factors (d) and (f) appear to stand apart

and independent from risk-utility balancing. Nor do the Shapo factors
reflect the fairness-based consumer expectations test. Factors (d) and (f)
may in some way be related to whether disappointed consumer expectations were responsible for the injury suffered by a plaintiff, but they go
well beyond the traditional consumer expectations test." It is difficult to
discern what theoretical framework Professor Shapo is espousing.
Courts and litigants required to examine Shapo's "considerations" for
guidance on how to decide a design defect case would be at sea. Professor Gary Schwartz put it well during the debate on this issue on the floor
of the 1995 ALI Annual Meeting. 42 He said that one could argue
whether the Reporters' proposal was or was not the majority rule in the
United States, but the Shapo proposal reflected the law of no jurisdiction.43
Turning to the individual factors, we are frankly puzzled regarding

their meaning. Consideration (a) embraces risk-utility balancing but
makes a delphic reference to "applicable law." One would think that a

Restatement would, itself, set forth what that law is. Consideration (b)
40. See Owen, supranote 3, at 1687. Professor Owen stated:
In design defect litigation, [the] basic issue involves the following fundamental microbalance question: whether the manufacturer'sfailureto adopt a particulardesign feature proposed by the plaintiffwas, on balance, right or wrong. A congruence between
this central issue and the liability test requires that the test focus squarely on the issue
of what, in particular, allegedly was wrong with the manufacturer's design decision.
More specifically, this inquiry asks whether the increased costs (lost dollars, lost utility,
and lost safety) of alteringthe design-in the particular manner the plaintiff claims was
reasonably necessary to the product's safety-would have been worth the resulting
safety benefits. Thus, the only factors ordinarily relevant in the risk-utility balance are
the incremental or "marginal" precaution costs and safety benefits of adopting the particular design safety feature proposed by the plaintiff. The notion of marginal costs and
benefits implies a move which here involves the move from the chosen design to the
alternative design. And so the proper balance is between the expected precaution costs
and the expected safety benefits involved in alteringthe chosen design in the particular
fashion proposed by the plaintiff-those costs and benefits incurred in moving from the
manufacturer's actual chosen design to the plaintiff's hypothetical alternative design.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
41. For example, consideration (f), dealing with disparity of knowledge between the manufacturer and consumer, raises issues far different than what the brute expectations of a consumer
are with regard to product performance.
42. See 1995 Discussion of Products Restatement, supranote 37, at 213-14.
43. See id.
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sets forth a risk-utility test that, to the Authors' knowledge, has yet to be
articulated by any court or scholar. If we understand what Professor
Shapo is saying, he is clearly wrong. Consideration (a) speaks to aggregate risk-utility balancing for the product. Consideration (b), however,
seems to say that if the cost of a "particular" injury outweighs the cost
of avoiding the injury, that may render the product defective.
It is hard to see how any risk-utility balancing for a particular injury is relevant to a decision as to whether a product is defectively designed. Products are manufactured in tens of thousands of identical
units. Any given injury may be prevented by some feature that might
have avoided the injury at a lower cost than a given catastrophic injury
if one simply calculates the cost of the particular feature for that individual product. That is, however, irrelevant to the question of whether
the safety feature should have been incorporated into the product line.
The probability of a particular injury may be so remote and so farfetched that to incorporate a safety feature for the entire product line
may be unreasonably costly. Alternatively, the safety feature, although
helpful in connection with a low-probability injury, may create far
greater risks for product performance across the board.' Risk-utility
balancing for a particular injury is espoused by no one and with good
reason. It is antithetical to any notion of reasonable and sensible design.
Professor Shapo includes two consumer expectations-type considerations in his list, but it is difficult to fathom how they might be applied in deciding whether a product is defectively designed. Thus, consideration (d) declares that promotion and advertising is relevant to the
issue of design defect when it has a "material influence on decisions to
use or encounter the product." We can understand that advertising and
marketing may encourage dangerous product use and thus increase the
probability of harm. Comment g to section 2 of the Products Restatement makes that point. 45 However, Professor Shapo seems to be suggest44.

The Products Restatement is clear on this part:
When evaluating the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety of
the product must be considered. It is not sufficient that the alternative design would
have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if it would also have introduced into the product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998); see also Richards v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Alabama law); Glover v. Bic Corp., 987
F.2d 1410, 1423 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying Oregon law).
45. The comment provides:
Consumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into account whether the proposed
alternative design could be implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative
design would provide greater overall safety. Nevertheless, consumer expectations about
product performance and the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are per-
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ing that advertising and marketing may affect whether a buyer decides
to purchase or use the product. This raises the issue of whether a manufacturer has provided sufficient information to consumers so that they
can make informed choices as to whether they wish to buy or use the
products. 6 The Products Restatement recognizes that a cause of action

for failure to provide sufficient information for consumer choice is relevant to failure-to-warn liability. But how informed choice is relevant to
design liability is a mystery. Indeed, the central premise of an informed-

ceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks of harm, both of which are
relevant under Subsection (b). Such expectations are often influenced by how products
are portrayed and marketed and can have a significant impact on consumer behavior.
Thus, although consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for
judging the defectiveness of product designs, they may substantially influence or even
be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing in judging whether the omission of
a proposed alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATmENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998) (citation omitted).
46. The courts developed an informed choice action in products liability almost a decade
after the onset of the products liability revolution. The first case to refer to an informed choice
theory was Borel v. FibreboardPaper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Several
early commentators distinguished between warnings to reduce the risk of harm, risk reduction
warnings, and warnings only to inform the purchaser that use of the product involves a nonreducible risk-informed choice warnings. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed
Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
607, 621-26 (distinguishing "risk reduction" warning cases from "informed choice" warning
cases); A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-DesignDefect
LitigationComes ofAge, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 519 (1976) (arguing that some failure-to-warn
cases belong in the realm of "informed consent" rather than in products liability). Others now recognize this distinction. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATrVES 608-14 (3d ed. 1983) (dividing failure-to-warn cases
into two categories, cases that involve "words advising of risk" and cases that involve "words reducing risk"); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCrS LABmiTY:
PROBLEMS AND PROcESS 342-50 (3d ed. 1997).
47. The Products Restatement recognizes a fallure-to-warn cause of action based on informed choice:
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of product
risks so that they can, by appropriate conduct during use or consumption, reduce the
risk of harm, warnings also may be needed to inform users and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the
product. Such warnings allow the user or consumer to avoid the risk warned against by
making an informed decision not to purchase or use the product at all and hence not to
encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must be provided for inherent risks that
reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would reasonably deem material
or significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product. Whether or not many
persons would, when warned, nonetheless decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to protect the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who would, based on their own reasonable assessments of the risks and benefits, decline product use or consumption. When such warnings are necessary, their
omission renders the product not reasonably safe at time of sale.
RESTATEENmT (FHIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998).
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choice products liability case is that a well-designed product may present risks that a consumer may not wish to encounter.
Consideration (f) in Shapo's list is no less enigmatic. Professor
Shapo suggests that if "there exists a significant difference between the
parties with respect to the knowledge of the risks of the product in the
context of its distribution and marketing," such a difference would be
relevant to whether the product was defectively designed. Once again,
disparities in knowledge of risks are relevant to failure-to-warn liability.
However, with regard to design liability, the issue is not the disparity of
knowledge or risk but whether the probability of foreseeable harm is
sufficient to warrant a safer design.
We urged that the Shapo proposal be rejected because it is theoretically unsound, practically unworkable, and out of harmony with the
overwhelming body of American case law. The vast majority of ALI
members agreed with us on both occasions.48 Professor Shapo simply
failed to present a viable alternative to the proposal of the Reporters.
11. THE POLITICS OF TORT REFORM
Several critics have sought to discredit the Products Restatement
by labeling it a "tort reform" project.49 In the past decade, manufacturers
have prevailed on state legislatures to enact product liability legislation
that, for the most part, has been antithetical to the interests of plaintiffs.
Groups such as the American Trial Lawyers Association have vigorously opposed these "tort reform" initiatives. Those seeking to characterize the Products Restatement as a "tort reform" package have either
not read the new Restatement or they have, themselves, a political
agenda in retaining the outmoded and open-ended section 402A as the
operative rule in American courts. Obfuscation and open-endedness are
apparently viewed, in some circles, as a desideratum. A court that has
no need to adhere to a rule of law or a coherent theoretical structure has
a roving mandate to "do good." Law, fairly articulated and evenly applied must, of necessity, impose constraints. Thus, political opposition
to the Products Restatement may stem not so much from what it says
48. See 1997 Discussion of ProductsRestatement, supra note 37, at 137; 1995 Discussion of
ProductsRestatement, supranote 37, at 199, 215.
49. See, e.g., Roundtable on ProductsLiability Litigation,TRtAL, Nov. 1997, at 22; Larry S.
Stewart, The ALI and Products Liability: "Restatement" or "Reform," TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 28,

30 ("mhe reporters may be feeling too much the gravitational pull of tort "reform."); Vandall,
Constructing a Roof, supra note 3, at 279 ("The treatment of design defect in the Restatement
(Third)is a political statement. It is not a restatement of the law and does not rest on an evaluation
of cases and policies.").
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than from the fact that it says anything at all. °
The charge that the Products Restatement constitutes the ALI
equivalent of "tort reform" legislation is simply ludicrous. Consider the
following positions that the Products Restatement takes that have been
strongly opposed by business and manufacturing interests.
A.

Conformance to State-of-the-Art Is Not a Bar to Recovery

In a fairly large number of jurisdictions, the business community
has sought to enact legislation creating a "state-of-the-art" defense.5
The purpose of this legislation is to establish an absolute immunity for
manufacturers if their products meet existing state-of-the-art standards.
The Products Restatement explicitly rejects any formal state-of-the-art
defense. Section 2, comment d provides:
Defendants often seek to defend their product designs on the ground
that the designs conform to the "state of the art." The term "state of the
art" has been variously defined to mean that the product design conforms to industry custom, that it reflects the safest and most advanced
technology developed and in commercial use, or that it reflects technology at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge.... This Section
states that a design is defective if the product could have been made
safer by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design. If such a design could have been practically adopted at time of sale and if the
omission of such a design rendered the product not reasonably safe,
the plaintiff establishes defect under Subsection (b).... If plaintiff introduces expert testimony to establish that a reasonable alternative
design could practically have been adopted, a trier of fact may conclude that the product was defective notwithstanding that such a design was not adopted by any manufacturer, or even considered for

50. See Aaron D. Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A ProposedAgenda, 10 TOURO
L. REv. 5, 19 (1993) (prognosticating, as a Reporter at the outset of the Products Restatement
project, that critics would attack the work product because it would clarify the law); see also
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1266-67 (1993) ("Although all may agree in the abstract that clarity is a desideratum, there may be considerable sympathy and nostalgia for the
studied ambiguity of section 402A. The confusion may be viewed as a positive good allowing for
a more leisurely development of the law ....
(footnote omitted)).
51. Their efforts have been successful in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668.12 (West 1987) (conformance with the state-of-the-art at the time the product was designed
is a defense); Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.310(2) (Michie 1992) (presumption exists that if a product
conforms to generally recognized and prevailing standards or the state-of-the-art in existence at the
time the design was prepared, it is not defective; presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of
the evidence).
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commercial use, at the time of sale."

The italicized language is particularly important. It makes clear
that if plaintiff presents a reasonable alternative design that could have
been practically adopted, the fact it "was not adopted by any manufacturer or even considered for commercial use at the time of sale," does
not necessarily prevent a finding that the product was defective.
B. Explicit Rejection of the PatentDangerRule
Defendants continue to argue that the consumer expectations test
should be utilized as a shield against recovery." As noted earlier, the
Products Restatement takes the position that the consumer expectations
test should not bar recovery if plaintiff can establish a reasonable alternative design. Section 2, comments d and g are unmistakably clear in
this regard:
Early in the development of products liability law, courts held that
a claim based on design defect could not be sustained if the dangers
presented by the product were open and obvious. Subsection (b) does
not recognize the obviousness of a design-related risk as precluding a
finding of defectiveness. The fact that a danger is open and obvious is
relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude
a plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable alternative design should
have been
adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the
55
plaintiff.

Subsection (b) ... rejects conformance to consumer expectations as

a defense. The mere fact that a risk presented by a product design is
open and obvious, or generally known, and that the product thus satisfies expectations, does not prevent a finding that the design is defective.

RESTATEmENT (THnu) OFTORTS: PRODS. LsB. § 2 cmt. d (1998) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second),
Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REv. 411, 418 (1993) (creating a proposed rule which
advocates the consumer expectations test as a bar to design defect liability).
54. See supratext accompanying notes 25-28.
55. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
56. See id. § 2 cmt. g.
52.
53.
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C. Reasonable Design Rather than Warnings Is Necessaryfor
OptimalProductSafety
The rule set forth in section 402A, comment j provides, "[w]here
warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read
and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use
if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous."' 7
This position illegitimately gives primacy to the role of warnings. s
It allows a defendant to escape liability for inadequate design by simply
warning against risks. The Products Restatement rejects this primitive
notion decisively. Section 2, comment Iprovides:
Reasonable designs and instructions or warnings both play important
roles in the production and distribution of reasonably safe products. In
general, when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks
can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of

such risks. For example, instructions and warnings may be ineffective
because users of the product may not be adequately reached, may be

likely to be inattentive, or may be insufficiently motivated to follow
59
the instructions or heed the warnings ....

57. RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 402 cmt. j (1965).
58. The commentj presumption has been sharply criticized. One commentator has argued:
The comment jpresumption embodies the behavioral assumption that "reasonable"
users can be expected to receive, correctly interpret, and obey every comprehensible
warning accompanying every product they use or encounter. Yet, people are exposed
each day to innumerable risks created by appliances that may malfunction or be mishandled; by potentially toxic pollutants, food additives, and other chemical substances;
by cosmetics, drugs, and cleansing agents that may be improperly applied and are inherently dangerous for some sensitive individuals; by machine tools, presses, and other
industrial or occupational equipment; and by hazardous transportation and recreation
devices. Indeed, almost all products present substantial risks if improperly manufactured, designed, or used. People would have to read, understand, remember, and follow
innumerable product warnings to protect themselves from all product-related risks they
may confront. Moreover, risk assessment is only one realm of decisionmaking and
people must devote some of their limited time and attention to many other types of
choices.
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1193, 1206-07 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also A.D. Twerski et al., supra note 46, at 506
(arguing that section 402A, comment j is "a gross simplification of a very complex problem" and
opining that assuming that consumers will comply with the warnings "may work some of the time
but not all of the time").
59. RESTATEmENT (TERD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LtAB. § 2 cmt. 1(1998).
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D. Recognition of Res Ipsa Inference of Defect
As noted earlier, section 3 of the Products Restatement recognizes
a res ipsa inference of defect without the necessity of establishing the
type of defect responsible for causing plaintiff's harm. 6° It provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was
caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution,
without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the
plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect;
and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other
than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.6'
Courts have said that res ipsa does not apply to strict products liability cases because the element of exclusive control of the instrumentality of the harm is lacking. 62 This canard is finally put to rest in the
Products Restatement. The recovery should not depend on whether the
defendant was physically in control of the product (the instrumentality
of the harm). If the facts surrounding the injury lead one to conclude
that product defect was a responsible causal agent for the plaintiff's injuries, it is appropriate to draw an inference of defect.
E. Compliance with Statute Does Not Create a
Presumptionof Non-Defectiveness
Many tort reform statutes provide that if a product complies with
governmental regulations, the product is presumed to be non-defective. 6

60. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
62. See supra note 15; see also Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-86 (Ct.
App. 1969) (refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur to a products liability case because the procedural
effect of invoking the doctrine in California is to switch the burden of proof to the defendant).
63. For example, section 108A of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act ("MUPLA")
provides:
When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in
compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety
standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective... unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent seller could and would have taken additional precautions.
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,730 (1979). Some state statutes go beyond
the MUPLA by creating either an affirmative defense or a rebuttable presumption that a product is
non-defective or not unreasonably dangerous based on compliance with regulatory standards. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(l)(b) (West 1997) (rebuttable presumption); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507:8-g (1997) (affirmative defense); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09 (Supp. 1997)
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The traditional common law rule is that compliance with a statute or
regulation is evidence that a trier of fact may consider in deciding
whether a product is defective, but compliance with a statute or regulation is not binding.4 The Products Restatement adopts the traditional
view and rejects the position that compliance with a statute or regulation
creates a formal presumption of non-defectiveness. 65 Furthermore, the
Products Restatement takes the position that a product that is in violation of a governmental standard is defective per se and that there exists
no "justifiable excuse" defense for violating a governmental safety
standard. 66

(rebuttable presumption); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980) (rebuttable presumption); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1996) (rebuttable presumption).
64. See RESTATFAMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 288C (1965); see also Burch v.
Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976) ("Mhe overwhelming majority of courts
presented with similar arguments in product liability cases have held that compliance with federal
and state requirements for the manufacture and sale of products does not immunize a manufacturer
or seller from liability."); Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 432
N.E.2d 920, 924 (111.App. Ct. 1982) ("Compliance with statutes and safety regulations is not conclusive evidence on the question of negligence. It is, however, relevant to that issue." (citations
omitted)); Turner v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 577 So. 2d 755, 756 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
("Compliance (or noncompliance) with the act is simply another factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances."); Jackson v. Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("The
introduction of [the federal automobile safety standard] into evidence was proper, although compliance by Volkswagen with the standards is 'only a piece of the evidentiary puzzle' and does not
grant immunity from strict liability." (quoting Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421
(5th Cir. 1985)); Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("[Flact
that the Food and Drug Administration, a Federal agency, had previously approved a package insert warning did not relieve the drug company of its obligation to communicate an adequate
warning to users of the dangerous drug in question.").
65. See RESTATENMEN (THmD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (1998).
66. See id. § 4 cmt. d (explaining the difference between ordinary non-product cases and
cases where the defendant violated a state or federal regulatory provision setting standards for
product safety). This comment states:
[The ... common-law rule governing noncompliance with safety statutes or regulations in negligence actions not involving products liability claims recognizes that noncompliance with an applicable safety statute or regulation does not constitute failure to
use due care when the defendant establishes a justification or excuse for the violation.
For example, if noncompliance with an administrative regulation under conditions of
emergency or temporary impossibility would not constitute a violation in a direct enforcement proceeding, noncompliance alone does not prove negligence. In connection
with the adequacy of product designs and warnings, however, design and marketing
decisions are made before distribution to users and consumers. The product seller therefore has the option of deferring sale until statutory or regulatory compliance is
achieved. Consequently, justification or excuse of the sort anticipated in connection
with negligence claims generally does not apply in connection with failure to comply
with statutes or regulations governing product design or warnings.
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F. Recognition of a Post-Sale Duty to Warnfor ProductsNot
Defective at the Time of Sale

Probably no issue has caused as much consternation to manufacturers as the issue of post-sale duty to warn. Defense groups have argued vociferously against the recognition of such a post-sale duty unless

the product was defective at the time of sale. Section 10 of the Products
Restatement recognizes a post-sale duty to warn that may arise because
of information that comes to the seller after the time of sale. Thus, the
product need not have been defective at the time of sale for the post-sale
warning duty to be triggered."
G. Liability in EnhancedInjury Cases When the Extent of
Enhancement Cannot Be Quantified
Crashworthiness litigation has embroiled the courts in a debate
concerning who bears the burden of proving the extent of enhanced injuries. In a typical case, the plaintiff would have suffered significant

injuries as a result of the collision in any event. Plaintiffs seek to prove
that their injuries are greater than they would otherwise have been because the automobile or other vehicle was not adequately designed.6

Some courts have held that it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to establish
that the inadequacy of the design was responsible for injuries beyond
that which the plaintiff would have suffered but must also quantify the
extent of the add-on injuries.69 Although in most cases experts can opine
67. See id. § 10.
68. At the very least, plaintiffs in crashworthiness cases must establish that the failure to
adopt a reasonable alternative design resulted in injuries over and above that which would have
resulted from other causes. The Products Restatement provides:
§ 16. Increased Harm Due to Product Defect
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or other distribution
and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm beyond that
which would have resulted from other causes, the product seller is subject to liability
for the increased harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16(a) (1998). Case law supports this proposition. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985); Czarnecki v.
Volkswagen of America, 837 P.2d 1143, 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 532 (Del. 1998).
69. See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 674 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir. 1981); Sumner
v. General Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), overruled on other
grounds by Lopez v. General Motors Corp., 569 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). The leading
decision espousing this view, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), predicted that New
Jersey would require plaintiffs to quantify the extent of the add-on injuries. If a plaintiff failed to
do so, he would recover no damages. The Authors predicted that New Jersey courts, when called
upon to rule on this issue, would disagree with the Third Circuit. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 16 reporters' notes, cmt. d (1998). Recently, in Green v. General Motors
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as to the extent of the enhanced injuries, in some cases they cannot do

so with any degree of precision. An expert may only be able to testify
that the inadequate design was responsible for some aggravation of the
plaintiff's injuries over what they would have been had the vehicle been
reasonably designed. When this is the case, those courts that require
plaintiff to quantify the enhanced injuries refuse to allow recovery.7O
The Products Restatement rejects this view and endorses the majority
position that once plaintiff establishes that a defect is responsible for
enhanced injuries, the inability to quantify the amount of those injuries
does not relieve the defendant of liability.7' If at the close of the case
evidence has not been introduced that would allow the finder of fact to
determine the harm that would have resulted in the absence of product

defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiff's harm attributable to the defect and other causes.
The Products Restatement position has been sharply criticized by
the defense bar." They argue that it is unfair to saddle the defendant
Corp., No. A-5756-95T2, 1998 WL 116851, at *8 (N.L Super. Ct. App. Div. March 18, 1998), the
court rejected Huddell and adopted the majority position. See also infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 251. The Caiazzo court declared:
We realize that a plaintiff's burden of offering evidence of what injuries would
have resulted absent the alleged defect will be heavy in some instances and perhaps
impossible in others. Where it is impossible, however, the plaintiff has merely failed to
establish his prima facie case, i.e., that it is more probable than not that the alleged defect aggravated or enhanced the injuries resulting from the initial collision.
Id.
71. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 16(b) and (c) provides that in a case
where a plaintiff has established that if defect has been responsible for some enhanced harm then
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other
causes in the absence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the
increased harm attributable solely to the product defect.
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that
would have resulted in the absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for
all of the plaintiff's harm attributable to the defect and other causes.
REsTATE mNT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 16(b), (c) (1998). This position has come to be
known as the Fox-Mitchellrule. A strong majority of states support this approach. See Mitchell v.
Volkswagenverk, AG, 669 F.2d 1199, 1207-08 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law); Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 659, 660 (Ga. 1992); Lahocki v. Contee Sand &
Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980); Green, 1998 WL 116851, at *8.
72. See, e.g., Heather Fox Vickles & Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not
Equal Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 417, 451 (1995) (concluding that the enhanced injury doctrine "should not result in enhanced liability for product manufacturers" and noting that
the debate over the doctrine "ultimately comes down to a question of fairness-fairness to those
directly involved in enhanced injury litigation [and] to the consuming public"); Michael Hoenig,
The American Law Institute Restatement Draft, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1994, at 3 (arguing that the
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with liability for harm that the plaintiff would have suffered in any
event as a result of the collision even if the product had been adequately
designed. Plaintiffs should carry the burden of proof on damages, and if
they cannot, they should lose. Furthermore, they argue that the case law
does not support the Products Restatement's position. We disagree on
both points. It appears truly unfair to deny a plaintiff enhanced injury
recovery when the reason for the inability to untangle the first and second collision injuries lies at the doorstep of the defendant. It was the defective design of the product that caused the enhanced injuries. Defendant, a wrongdoer who in fact has caused harm to the plaintiff, should
not escape liability because the nature of the harm makes an exact de-

termination of the harm impossible." We are also convinced that the
authority throughout the country firmly supports the Products Restate-

ment position.74
III. CONCLUSION
The Products Restatement project engendered strong substantive
debate. One would not expect otherwise. The ALI has a long tradition of
vigorous debate in the area of tort law. Cognoscenti will remember the
famous "Battle of the Wilderness" when the titans of American tort law
debated whether the Institute should recognize an independent defense
of assumption of risk. 7 That debate was not about "politics." It was
about what medium the law should utilize to account for voluntary riskProducts Restatement position opens the door to plaintiffs seeking deep-pocket defendants in an
attempt to circumvent the "apportionment of liability" rule and instead opt to show that the defendant is liable for "all the harm" whether caused by him or other tortfeasors).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 433B cmt. d, at 444 (1965).
74. In a lengthy reporters' note, the Authors demonstrate that a strong majority of courts
follow the Fox-Mitchell rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 reporters'
note, cmt. d (1998).
75. In Halepeska v. CallihanInterests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963), Justice Greenhill
described the skirmish:
In preparing Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second, the advisers sharply divided. A
group mainly of distinguished deans and professors, favored striking the entire chapter
of Assumption of Risk. They would use contributory negligence. The group includes
Deans Page, Keeton and Wade, and Professors James, Malone, Morris, Seavey and
Thurman. Mr. Eldredge prepared a "dissent" for this group. The group is referred to in
the notes to the draft as "The Confederacy." Others including Prosser, Professor Robert
Keeton, and Judges Fee, Flood, Traynor and Goodrich supported the existence of the
defense of assumed risk. The distinguished scholars refer to the debate, among themselves, as "The Battle of the Wilderness." The Reporter, Prosser, states in the draft that
the American Law Institute Council voted unanimously to follow the recommendations
of the sections on assumption of the risk.
Id. at 378 n.3.
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taking on the part of plaintiffs. Similarly the substantive debate about
the best way to articulate the standard for defective design pitted sharply
differing views against each other. It is unfortunate that the debate concerning the appropriate standard for defective design took place at the
same time that the country as a whole was going through what has come
to be known as the "tort crisis" and the concomitant "tort reform"
movement. But the ALI debate on the issue of defective design and the
other issues discussed in this Article was not about the politics of tort
reform. It was a substantive debate about what courts have been, and
should be, doing. Those who eloquently opposed our views are demeaned by characterizing their efforts and ours in crass political terms.
We met openly on the battlefield of ideas, not in smoke-filled back
rooms. We exchanged ideas and fought for our respective positions as to
what the law is and what it should be. That is the anthem of The American Law Institute. All who participated in its deliberation sang in its
chorus.
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